We use student achievement data from the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA 2000) to estimate international education production functions. The student-level database allows an extension of previous evidence based on student achievement in math and science to reading literacy, and it contains important new data on potential determinants. We find that student characteristics, family backgrounds, home inputs, resources and teachers, and institutional structures of the schooling system all exert effects on students' educational performance. In terms of resource endowments, material endowment and teacher education exert positive effects, but not smaller classes. In terms of institutions, standardized examinations and external budget determination are conducive to student performance, while school autonomy is conducive in deciding budget allocations, textbook purchase, and hiring teachers. In general, school autonomy is more beneficial in systems with external exit exams. Students perform better in privately operated schools, but on the funding side, larger public involvement is not detrimental. Altogether, our empirical models explain more than 85% of the between-country variation in student performance in each of the subjects.
Introduction
The results of the Programme for International Student Assessment, the so-called PISA study, conducted in 2000 by the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), triggered a vigorous public debate on the quality of education systems in most participating countries, making the headlines on the front pages of tabloids and more serious newspapers alike. For example, The Times (Dec. 6, 2001) in England titled, "Are we not such dunces after all?", and Le Monde (Dec. 5, 2001) in France titled, "France, the mediocre student of the OECD class". In Germany, the PISA results made headlines in all leading newspapers for several weeks (a representative headline was, "Abysmal marks for German students" (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Dec. 4, 2001) ), putting education policy at the forefront of attention ever since. "PISA" is now a catch-phrase for the poor state of the German education system known by everybody. While this coverage proves the immense public interest, the quality of much of the underlying analysis -if the public assessments are at all based on the evidence produced by the PISA study rather than just repeating long-held believes -is less clear. It is usually based on bilateral comparisons between two countriese.g., a commentator's home country compared to the top performer (Finland in the case of performance in reading literacy) -and more often than not, it is bivariate, presenting the simple correlation between student performance and a single potential determinant -say, educational spending. 1 Economic theory suggests that one important set of determinants of educational performance are the institutions of the education system, because these set the incentives for the actors in the education process. Among the institutions that have been theorized to impact the quality of education are public versus private financing and provision (e.g., Epple and Romano 1998; Nechyba 1999 Nechyba , 2000 Chen and West 2000) , the centralization of financing (e.g., Hoxby 1999 Hoxby , 2001 Nechyba 2003) , external versus teacher-based standards and examinations (e.g., Costrell 1994; Betts 1998; Bishop and Wößmann 2004) , centralization versus school autonomy in curricular, budgetary, personnel and process decisions (e.g., Bishop and Wößmann 2004) and performance-based incentive contracts (Hanushek et al. 1994 ). In many countries, the impact that these schooling institutions may have on student performance as stressed by economic theory tends to be ignored in actual educational 1 Given that the number of observations N equals 2 in a two-country comparison, the number of potential determinants analyzed at one time has to be 1, implicitly assuming that no other determining factor is of importance to the analysis. policies, which tend to focus on the implicitly assumed positive link from schooling resources to student performance.
One reason for this neglect may be that the lack of institutional variations within most education systems makes an empirical observation of the impact of institutions impossible when using national datasets, as is standard in most empirical research on educational production (cf., e.g., Hanushek 2002 and the references therein). However, such institutional variation is given in cross-country data, and evidence based on previous international student achievement tests such as IAEP (Bishop 1997) , TIMSS (Bishop 1997; Wößmann 2003a) and TIMSS-Repeat (Wößmann 2003b) supports the view that institutions play a key role in determining student performance. These international databases allow for multi-country multivariate analyses, which ensure that the impact of each determinant is estimated for otherwise similar schools by holding the effects of other determinants constant.
In this paper, we use the PISA database to test the robustness of the findings of these previous studies of international education production functions. 2 Combining the performance data with background information from student and school questionnaires, we estimate the influence of student background, schooling resources, and schooling institutions on the international variation in students' educational performance. In contrast to Bishop's (1997) country-level analysis, we perform the analysis at the level of the individual student, which allows us to take advantage of within-country variations in the different determinants in addition to the between-country variations, hugely increasing the degrees of freedom of the analysis.
In addition to testing the robustness of findings derived from previous international student achievement tests, the analysis based on PISA contributes several additional new aspects to the literature. First, PISA tested a new subject, namely reading literacy, in addition to math and science already tested in IAEP and TIMSS. This alternative measure of performance broadens the outcome of the education process regarded in the analyses. There is already economic research estimating production functions using PISA data, but mostly on a national scale. Thus, Fertig (2003a) uses the US sample of the PISA dataset to analyze class composition and peer group effects. Fertig (2003b) uses the German PISA sample to analyze determinants of German students' achievement. Wolter and Vellacott (2002) use the Swiss PISA sample to study the effects of sibling rivalry. Wolter (2003) extends this analysis to six countries (Belgium, Canada, Finland, France and Germany, in addition to Switzerland). To our knowledge, the only previous study using the PISA data to estimate multivariate education production functions in an international context is Fertig and Schmidt (2002) , who, sticking to reading performance, do not focus on estimating determinants of the international variation in student performance but rather on estimating conditional national performance scores.
Second, particularly in reading, but also in the more traditional domains of math and science, "PISA aims to define each domain not merely in terms of mastery of the school curriculum, but in terms of important knowledge and skills needed in adult life" (OECD 2000, p. 8) . That is, rather than being curriculum-based as the previous studies, "PISA looked at young people's ability to use their knowledge and skills in order to meet real-life challenges" (OECD 2001, p. 16) . For example, reading literacy is defined in terms of "the capacity to understand, use and reflect on written texts, in order to achieve one's goals, to develop one's knowledge and potential, and to participate in society" (OECD 2000, p. 10) . There is a similar real-life related focus in the other two subjects. While on the one hand, this real-life focus should constitute the most important outcome of the education process, on the other hand it bears the caveat that schools are assessed not on the basis of what their curriculum (i.e. their school system) asks them to teach, but rather on what students might need particularly well for coping with everyday life.
Third, rather than targeting students in specific grade levels as in previous studies, PISA's target population are the 15-year-old students of each country, regardless of the specific grade they may currently be attending. This target population is not only interesting because it means that PISA assesses young people near the end of their compulsory schooling, but also because it captures students of the very same age in each country independent of the structure of national school systems, rather than the somewhat artificial grade-related focus which may be distorted by differing entry ages and grade-repetition rules in different countries.
Fourth, the PISA data provide more detailed information than previous international studies about some institutional characteristics of the school systems, e.g. by providing data on whether schools are publicly or privately operated, on which share of their funding stems from public or private sources, and on whether schools can fire their teachers. These features of the background data help to identify improved internationally comparable measures of schooling institutions.
Fifth, the PISA data also provide more detailed information than the previous international studies about some characteristics of the family background of students. For instance, there is information about the occupation of parents and the availability of computers at home. This should contribute to a more robust assessment of the different potential determinants of student performance. Finally, reading literacy is likely to depend more heavily on familybackground variables than performance in math and science. Hence controlling for family-background variables should more generally establish a more robust test of the institutionsperformance link if the ability to read is the dependent variable.
Taken together, the PISA international dataset should allow for a rigorous assessment of the determinants of international differences in student performance in general, and of the link from schooling institutions to student performance in particular. The rich PISA student-level dataset offers the possibility to re-examine previous international studies for the validity of their derived results in the context of different subjects, different definitions of required capabilities and different target populations, and to extent the examination by including more detailed data.
Our main findings are as follows. As in the previous studies, students' family background has a consistently strong impact on their educational performance. However, the effects of family background as measured by parental education or the number of books at home are considerably stronger in reading than in math and science. Furthermore, while boys outperform girls in math and science, the opposite is true in reading. Contrary to previous studies, a country's educational expenditure per student is statistically significantly positively related to student performance in PISA, albeit yielding only a small effect. While smaller classes do not go hand in hand with superior student performance, better equipment with instructional material and better-educated teachers do.
In terms of institutional effects, we find that standardized testing has a positive impact on performance in all three subjects. Confirming previous evidence, external exit exams are significantly related to superior student performance in math. The estimated effect is statistically insignificant in science and reading, although this might just be the result of the poor data quality on the existence of external exit exams in these other subjects. Consistent with previous evidence, school autonomy is related to superior student performance in personnel-management and process decisions such as the hiring of teachers, textbook choice and deciding budget allocations within schools, while centralized decision-making is better suited to enhance student learning in decision-making areas with large scope for decentralized opportunistic behavior, such as formulating the overall school budget. Furthermore, the performance effects of school autonomy tend to be more beneficial when external exit exams are in place. These institutional findings are mostly consistent across the three subject areas.
Finally, students in publicly operated schools perform worse than students in privately operated schools, while higher public funding is not related to inferior performance -and, holding the mode of operation constant, is actually statistically significantly related to superior performance in math.
At the country level, our empirical models can account for more than 85% of the total between-country variation in test scores. Institutions alone account for roughly one quarter of the international variation in student performance. Thus, institutional structures of schooling systems are again found to be important determinants of students' educational performance.
In the age of the evolving knowledge-based economy, these results could significantly contribute to the actual controversial debates about schooling reform.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the database of the PISA international student performance study. Section 3 exposes the econometric model. Section 4 presents the basic estimation results. Section 5 adds further evidence regarding interaction effects between external exit exams and other institutions. Section 6 analyzes the explanatory power at the country level of the model and its different categories of impact factors. Section 7 concludes.
The PISA International Student Performance Database
The international dataset used in this analysis is the OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). In 2000, the PISA study was conducted in 32 developed and emerging countries, 28 of which are OECD countries, in order to obtain an international comparable database concerning the educational achievement of 15-year-old students in reading, math, and science. The organization and conduction of the study by the OECD ensured as much comparability among participants as possible and a consistent and coherent test study design. 3 The countries participating in the PISA 2000 study are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Liechtenstein, 4 Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
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As described in the introduction, PISA's target population were the 15-year-old students in each country, or more specifically, students who were aged between 15 years and 3 months and 16 years and 2 months at the beginning of the assessment period and who were enrolled in an educational institution, regardless of the grade level or type of institution in which they were enrolled. The average age of OECD-country students participating in PISA was 15 years and 8 months, varying by less than 0.2 years between the participating countries.
The PISA sampling procedure ensured that a representative sample of 15-year-old students was tested in each country. Most PISA countries employed a two-stage stratified sampling technique. The first stage drew a (usually stratified) random sample of schools in which 15-year-old students were enrolled, yielding a minimum sample of 150 schools per country. The second stage randomly sampled 35 of the 15-year-old students in each of these schools (with each 15-year-old student in a school having equal probability of selection). Within each country, this sampling procedure typically led to a sample of between 4,500 and 10,000 tested students.
The performance tests were paper and pencil tests, with the assessment lasting a total of two hours for each student. Test items included both multiple-choice items and questions requiring the students to construct their own responses. The PISA tests were constructed to test a range of relevant skills and competencies that reflected how well young adults are prepared to meet the challenges of the future by being able to analyze, reason and communicate their ideas effectively. Each subject was tested using a broad sample of tasks with differing levels of difficulty in order to represent a coherent and comprehensive indicator of the continuum of students' abilities. Using item response theory, PISA mapped performance in each subject on a scale with an international mean of 500 test-score points across the OECD countries and an international standard deviation of 100 test-score points across the OECD countries. The main focus of the PISA 2000 study was on reading literacy, with two-thirds of the testing time devoted to this subject. In the other two subjects, smaller samples of students were tested. The correlation of student performance between the three subjects is substantial, at 0.639 between math and science (39,079 joint observations), 0.700 between math and reading (96,913) and 0.718 between science and reading (96, 815) .
In addition to the performance tests, both students and school principals answered a respective background questionnaire, yielding rich background information on students' personal characteristics and family backgrounds as well as on schools' resource endowments and institutional settings. Combining the available data, we constructed a dataset containing 174,227 students in 31 countries tested in reading literacy. In math, the sample size is 96,855 students, and 96,758 students in science. The dataset combines the student test scores in reading, math, and science with students' characteristics, family-background data, and schoolrelated variables of resource use and institutional settings. 5 For estimation purposes, a variety of the qualitative variables were transformed into dummy variables. Table 1 gives an overview of the variables employed in our estimations and presents their international descriptive statistics. The table also includes information on the amount of original versus missing data for each variable. In order to have a complete dataset of all students for whom we have at least performance data and some background data, we imputed missing values for individual variables using the methods explained in the Appendix. Given the large set of explanatory variables considered and given that each of these variables is missing for some students, dropping all student observations from the analysis which have a missing value on at least one variable would have meant a severe reduction in sample size.
While the percentage of missing values of each individual variable ranges from 0.9% to 33.3% (cf. Table 1), the percentage of students with a missing value on least one of the variables reported in Table 1 is 72.6% in reading -i.e., the sample size would be as small as 47,782 students from 20 countries in reading (26,228 students from 19 countries in math and 24,049 students from 19 countries in science). Apart from the general reduction in sample size, dropping all students with a missing value on at least one variable would delete the information available on the other explanatory variables for these students, and it would introduce bias if the values are not missing at random. Thus, data imputation is the only viable way of performing this broad-based analysis. As described in Section 3.1 below, the estimations we employ ensure that the estimated effects of each variable are not driven by the imputed values.
In addition to the rich PISA data at the student and school level, we also use some countrylevel data on the countries' GDP per capita in 2000 (measured in purchasing power parities (PPP), taken from World Bank 2003), on their average educational expenditure per student in 5 We do not use data on teaching methods, teaching climate, or teacher motivation as explanatory variables, because we basically view these as outcomes of the education system. First, such measures are endogenous to the institutional surrounding of the education system which sets the appropriate incentives to use specific methods or created a specific climate, thereby constituting the deeper cause of such factors. Second, such measures may be as much the outcome of students' performance as their cause, i.e. they are left-hand-side rather than right-hand-side variables. 
Econometric Analysis of the Education Production Function

Estimation Equation, Covariance Structure and Sampling Weights
The microeconometric estimation equation of the education production function has the following form:
where T is is the achievement in reading, math, or science of student i in school s. B is a vector of student background data (including student characteristics, family background and home inputs), R is a vector of data concerning the resource endowment, and I is a vector of institutional characteristics. The parameter vectors β 1 to β 9 will be estimated in the regression.
Note that this specification of the international education production function restricts each effect to be the same in all countries, as well as at all levels (within schools, between schools, and between countries). While it might be interesting to analyze the potential heterogeneity of certain effects between countries and between levels, regarding the object of interest of this paper it seems warranted to abstain from this effect heterogeneity and estimate a single "average" effect for each variable.
As discussed in the previous section, some of the data are imputed rather than original.
Generally, data imputation introduces measurement error in the explanatory variables, which
should make it more difficult to observe statistically significant effects. Still, to make sure Owing to the complex data structure produced by the PISA survey design and the multilevel nature of the explanatory variables, the error term ε of the regression has a non-trivial structure. Although we include a considerable amount of school-related variables, we cannot be sure that there are no omitted variables at the school level. Given the possible dependence of students within the same school, the use of higher-(school)-level variables, and the fact that schools were the primary sampling unit (PSU) in PISA (see Section 2), there may be unobservable correlation among the error terms ε i at the school level (cf. Moulton 1986 for this hierarchical-data-structure problem). We correct for potential correlations of the error terms by imposing an adequate structure on the covariance matrix. Thus, we suppose the error term to have the following structure:
where η s is the school-level element of the error term and υ i is the student-specific element of the error term. We use clustering-robust linear regressions (CRLR) to estimate standard errors that recognize this clustering of the student-level data within schools. The CRLR method relaxes the independence assumption and requires only that the observations be independent across the PSUs, i.e. across schools. By allowing any given amount of correlation within the PSUs, CRLR estimates appropriate standard errors when many observations share the same value on some but not all independent variables (cf. Deaton 1997) . To avoid inefficiency due to heteroscedasticity, CRLR imposes a clustered covariance structure on the covariance matrix, allowing within-school correlations of the error term. Thus, the form of the covariance
with ∑ i (i=1,…,l) representing the covariance matrices of the residuals of least-square regressions within each school cluster (PSU). Observations of two different PSUs are thus assumed to be independent and uncorrelated, leading to the block-diagonal matrix V with PSUs as diagonal elements. This method yields consistent and efficient estimates, enabling valid statistical inferences of the obtained estimation results (cf. White 1984).
Finally, PISA used a stratified sampling design within each country, producing varying sampling probabilities for different students. To obtain nationally representative estimates from the stratified survey data at the within-country level, we employ weighted least squares (WLS) estimation using the sampling probabilities as weights. WLS estimation ensures that the proportional contribution to the parameter estimates of each stratum in the sample is the same as would have been obtained in a complete census enumeration (DuMouchel and Duncan 1983; Wooldridge 2001) . Furthermore, at the between-country level, our weights
give equal weight to each of the 31 countries, which we also define as strata in the international dataset.
Cross-sectional Data and Potential Resource Endogeneity
The econometric estimation of the PISA dataset is restricted by its cross-sectional nature, which does not allow for panel or value-added estimations, but only for cross-sectional estimations in levels. This does not yield estimation biases as long as the explanatory variables are exogenous to the dependent variable and as long as they and their impact on the dependent variable do not vary over time. It seems straightforward that the student-specific family background B is is exogenous to the students' educational performance. Furthermore, most aspects of the family background B is are time-invariant, so that the characteristics observed at the given point in time of the PISA survey should be consistent indicators for family characteristics in the past. Therefore, student-related family background, as well as other student-related characteristics like area of residence, affects not only the educational value-added in the year of examination but rather the educational performance through a student's entire school life. A level-estimation approach thus seems well-suited for determining the total effects of family background and student-related characteristics on students' achievements.
A similar case can be made with respect to institutional differences. The institutional features I s of an education system may be reasonably assumed to be exogenous to individual students' performance. However, a caveat applies here in that a country's institutions may be related to unobserved, e.g. cultural, factors which in turn may be related to student performance. To the extent that this may be an important issue, caution should prevail in drawing causal inferences and policy conclusions from the presented results. In terms of time variability, changes in institutions generally occur only gradually and evolutionary rather than radically, particularly in democratic societies. Therefore, the institutional structures of education systems are highly time-invariant and thus most likely constant (or at least rather similar) during a student's school life. We therefore assume that the educational institutions observed at one point in time persist unchanged during the whole student life and thus contribute to students' achievement levels, and not only to the change in one period relative to the previous school period.
The situation becomes more problematic when students' resource endowments R is are concerned. For example, educational expenditure per student have been shown to vary considerably over time (cf. Gundlach et al. 2001) . Still, as far as the cross-country variation in educational expenditure is concerned, the assumption of relatively constant relative expenditure levels seems not too implausible, so that country-level estimates of expenditure per student in the year of the PISA survey may yield a reasonable proxy for the overall expenditure per student over students' hitherto school life.
However, students' educational resource endowments are not necessarily exogenous to their educational performance. Resource endogeneity should not be a serious issue at the country level, due to a missing supranational government body redistributing educational expenditures according to students' achievement and due to international mobility constraints.
But within countries, endogenous resource allocations -both between and within schoolsmay bias least-squares estimates of the effects of resources on student performance. In order to avoid biases due to the within-school sorting of school resources according to the needs and achievement of students, Akerhielm (1995) suggests an IV estimation approach that uses exogenous school-level variables as instruments for class size. Accordingly, in our regressions we use the student-teacher ratio at the school level as an instrument for the actual class size in each subject in a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation. 7 However, this approach may still be subject to the between-school sorting of differently achieving students according to schools' resource endowments, e.g. caused by school-related settlement decisions of parents. To the extent that the between-school sorting is unrelated to the familybackground and institutional characteristics for which we control in our regressions, it might still bias the estimated resource effects. Furthermore, variations in individual students' 7 Note that this approach also accounts for measurement-error biases in the class-size variable.
resource endowments over time, e.g. class-size variations, may also bias the levels-based estimates, generally resulting in a downward attenuation bias.
Estimation Results
This section discusses the results of estimating equation (1) for the three subjects. The results are reported in Table 2 . The discussion is subdivided by categories of explanatory variables:
first, student characteristics, family background and home inputs; second, resources and teacher characteristics; and third, institutions. The discussion generally begins with results in math and science, the two subjects that have been studied before, and then extents to results in reading.
Student Characteristics, Family Background and Home Inputs
In all three subjects, the educational performance of 15-year-old students increases statistically significantly with the grade level in which they are enrolled. Particularly at the lower grades, this effect is larger in reading than in math and science. For example, 15-yearolds enrolled in 7 th grade perform 106.2 achievement points (AP) lower in the reading test than 15-year-olds enrolled in 10 th grade. Controlling for the grade level, students' age is statistically significantly negatively related to math and reading performance, presumably reflecting grade repetition effects. This age effect is relatively small, though, with a maximum performance difference between the oldest and youngest students in the sample, who are 13 months of age apart, of 4.9 AP in reading.
In math and science, boys perform statistically significantly better than girls, at 16.1 AP in math and 3.9 AP in science. The opposite is true in reading, where girls outperform boys by 23.9 AP. Given that the test scores are scaled to have an international standard deviation among the OECD countries of 100, the size of these effects can be interpreted as percentage points of an international standard deviation. As concrete benchmark for size comparisons, the unconditional performance difference between 9 th -and 10 th -grade students (the two largest grade categories) in our sample is 30.3 AP in math, 32.4 in science and 33.2 in reading. That is, the boys' lead in math equals roughly half of this grade equivalent, and the girls' lead in reading equals roughly two thirds of the grade equivalent. As an alternative benchmark, when estimating the average unconditional performance difference per month between students of different age and extrapolating this to a performance difference per year of age, this is equal to 12.9 AP in math, 19.3 in science and 16.4 in reading.
The immigration status of students and their families is also statistically significantly related to their educational achievement. Students born in their country of residence perform 4.8 AP better in math than students not born in the country. Additionally, students performed 6.5 AP better when there mother was born in the country, and 5.6 AP if there father was born in the country. In sum, these three immigration effects add up to a performance difference of 16.9 AP between students from native families and students who themselves and whose parents were not born in the country. The effects are even bigger in science and reading than in math, at more than 26 AP. There is a clear pattern of performance differences by family status, with students who live with both parents performing better than students living with a single mother, the latter performing better than students living with a single father, and the latter performing better than students not living with any parent. 8 In each subject, student performance increases steadily with each higher category of their parents' education. 9 The effect of parental education is larger in reading than in math and science, with the maximum performance difference between students whose parents did not complete primary education and students whose parents have a university degree being 34.3 AP in reading, 26.9 in math and 26.5 in science.
Two new categories of variables, available in PISA but not in the previous international achievement tests, concern the work status of the students' parents. First, students who had at least one parent working full time performed statistically significantly higher than students whose parents did not work, at between 10.6 and 15.8 AP in the three subjects. However, there was no statistically significant performance difference between students whose parents did not work and students whose parents worked at most half-time. Neither was there a statistically significant performance difference depending on whether one or both parents worked full-time. Second, students' performance also differed statistically significantly depending on their parents' occupation. Children of blue-collar workers performed between 12.0 and 13.4 AP worse than the residual category, and children of white-collar workers performed between 15.7 and 20.8 AP better than the residual category. 10 As throughout the 8
In math, the difference between students living with a single father and students living with no parent is not statistically significant.
9
Parental education is measured by the highest educational category achieved by either father or mother, whatever is higher.
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White-collar workers were defined as major group 1-3 of the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO), encompassing legislators, senior officials and managers; professionals; and technicians and associate professionals. Blue-collar workers were defined as ISCO 8-9, encompassing plant and machine operators and assemblers; and sales and services elementary occupations. The residual category between the two, ranging from ISCO 4-7, encompasses clerks; services workers and shop and market sales workers; skilled paper, these effects are calculated holding all other influence factors constant. That means, for example, that they are estimated for a given level of parents' education.
Another indicator of family background that is strongly and statistically significantly related to student performance is the number of books in the students' home. For example, students with more than 500 books at home performed 64.9 AP better in math than students without any books at home. The effect size is similar in science, but larger in reading at 84.6 AP. Note that while the performance of students increases steadily with the number of books in their home increasing to 500 books, the effect of this indicator seems to peter out at more than 250 books, with no statistically significant performance difference in any subject between 250-500 books and more than 500 books.
In comparison to the previous effects, performance differences by community location of the schools are relatively modest. Only at the size of cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants is there a statistically significant superior performance relative to village locations in all three subjects. With cities of more than 1 million inhabitants, there is a performance advantage relative to village schools for schools located in the city center, but not for schools located elsewhere in the city. Finally, in contrast to previous studies, student performance is not statistically significantly related to higher GDP per capita in our basic specification, once all the other impact factors are controlled for. This finding may be partly due to the fact that PISA features the relatively homogenous sample of OECD countries, which are all developed countries among which differences in GDP per capita may play a minor role for students' achievement. In math, the estimate in the basic specification is even statistically significantly negative, but this finding vanishes once additional interaction effects between institutional factors are taken into account as in Section 5 below. In this latter specification, the effect of GDP per capita in science and reading turns statistically significantly positive.
Summarizing across the subjects, the results on effects of student characteristics and family background in reading are qualitatively the same as in math and science, with the sole exception of the gender effect. Furthermore, most of the family-background effects tend to be larger in reading than in math and science. In general, the result are very much in line with results derived from previous international student achievement tests (e.g., Wößmann 2003a).
In addition to measures of student characteristics and family background, we observe three features of incentives and inputs in the students' home. Students in schools whose principals agricultural and fishery workers; and craft and related trades workers. The variable was set to while-collar if at least one parent was in ISCO 1-3, and to blue-collar if no parent was in ISCO 1-7.
reported that learning was strongly hindered by lack of parental support performed significantly worse in all subjects. The opposite was true for students in schools whose principals reported that learning was not at all hindered by lack of parental support.
Another input factor at home is the homework done by students. Students reporting that they spent more than one hour on homework and study per week in the specific subject performed statistically significantly better than students who spent less than one hour on homework per week. In math and science, students who spent more than three hours on homework per week performed even better. This was not the case in reading, where students spending more than three hours on homework per week performed slightly lower than students spending between one and three hours, suggesting that reading performance may be an inverted-U shaped function of homework time. The generally positive effect of homework found in PISA differs from previous findings based on TIMSS, where no such effect was found (Wößmann 2003a) . This may mainly reflect improved data in PISA, as the homework variable in TIMSS reflected teachers' reports on how much time of homework they assigned, while the homework variable in PISA reflects students' reports on how much time they actually spent doing homework. The differing findings may reflect that homework assigned by the teacher may be very different from homework completed by the students.
A third home input factor deemed to be increasingly important in modern societies is the availability of computers at home. The bivariate correlation between PISA performance and computers at home is statistically significantly positive in all three subjects, and this positive relation carries through to multivariate regressions that additionally control for grade, age and gender. However, once all other influence factors in Table 2 are controlled for -and particularly, once family background is controlled for -the effect of having one or more computers at home turns around to be statistically significantly negative. That is, the bivariate positive correlation between computers and performance seems to capture other positive family-background effects that are not related to computers, because computer availability is positively correlated with these other family-background characteristics. Holding the other family-background characteristics constant, students perform significantly worse if they have computers at home. This may reflect the fact that computers at home may actually distract students from learning, both because learning with the help of computers may not be the most efficient way of learning and because computers can be used for other aims than learning.
This complements and corroborates the findings by Angrist and Lavy (2002) that computer availability in the classroom does not seem to advance student performance.
Resources and Teacher Characteristics
The level of expenditure per students in a country is found in the estimation to be statistically significantly positive in math and science, and positive but not statistically significant in reading. 11 This finding is contrary to previous studies (cf. Wößmann 2003a) which did not find positive effects of increased educational spending in terms of educational expenditure per student. In the extended estimation including institutional interactions, the statistically positive effects vanish and become statistically insignificant in reading and science, whereas the statistically significant effect in mathematics is robust to the modified specification. The positive resource effects of increased educational spending are relatively modest compared to alternative possible institutional interventions, ranging from 1.5 to 10.7 AP for each 1000$ of additional annual spending, so that a mere resource expansion is probably inferior and less promising than institutional reforms.
The class size effect in our estimation is positive in all subjects and statistically significant in mathematics and science. 12 This counterintuitive result should hereby not be interpreted as a causal effect since we did not control in the estimation strategy for between-school sorting, which could be either induced by Tiebout (1956) choice or by different school tracks which induce systematically asymmetric class sizes among a school system. 13 Another important resource factor is the adequate equipment of schools with instructional material. Sufficient equipment of schools with instructional material leads to an increase up to 22.0 AP (depending on the subject) compared to a situation of strongly lacking instructional material and is statistically significant in all three subjects. 14 Instructional time per year has a statistically significantly positive effect in mathematics and science and counterintuitively a statistically significantly negative one in reading, which could be an indication that especially the curriculum content of language classes does not perfectly fit the requirements of the PISA "reading literacy" skills. The magnitude of these effect is nevertheless quite small, at most 1.1 APs per 1000 minutes instruction time per year (1000 minutes are equivalent to 13% of total instruction time) which limits possible gains related to instruction time expansions.
11 This effect must be understood as a ceteris paribus result (holding institutional and other features constant) and as an average effect for the studied countries. An average increase for the studied country sample does not necessarily mean that for every included country (potentially the ones with inefficient resource use) an expenditure increase leads to an increase in student achievement.
12 Class size is instrumented by a schools student-teacher ratio.
The last examined factor in this category is teachers' education. The general pattern in this category is that a higher share of university educated (or certified) teachers at school has a statistically significantly positive effect on student achievement in all three subjects. 15 The results indicate that a master degree in the tested subjects is more important than a master degree in pedagogy and that additional certification of teachers by local school authorities can also improve student achievement by at most 15.2 APs, reflecting probably gains of either standardized requirement for teachers or informational advantages of local authorities in choosing and educating teachers to local needs.
The general pattern of the resource characteristics can be summarized as follows: In the analysis several evidences for positive resource effects are found, but these effects are mainly related to the quality of the employed instruction material or the quality of the teaching force and not to smaller classes. Positive effects of higher levels of educational expenditure per student on student achievement should be cautiously interpreted and not misinterpreted to call for expenditure increases since our analysis is not a cost-benefit analysis so that the results do not guarantee that the benefits exceed the costs.
Institutional Effects
Students in school systems with external exit exams perform statistically significantly better in mathematics by 19.1 APs, replicating previous findings of other studies in Bishop (1997) and Wößmann (2003a Wößmann ( , 2003b , whereas in science and reading students in school systems with external exit exams do not perform statistically significantly better. This finding could be induced either by poor measurement of the external exit exam indicator, less importance of external examination in these two subjects or by small sample problems. 16 The implementation of standardized tests has no statistically significantly positive effect. 17 Estimating the effect without external exit exams increases the effect of standardized tests in math and science and reading to 3.6 AP, now statistically significant in all three subjects. As we will see below in Section 5, standardized tests have mainly a positive effect on students' achievement through the interaction term with central exit exams. 15 With the exemption of the master degree in mathematics, we find statistically significant effects.
16 Small sample problems could be caused by only 31 independent observations on country level. This conjecture seems nevertheless less probable since the results in mathematics with should also be plagued by small-sample problems deliver sensible results.
17 Standardized tests-dummy equals 1 if 15-year old students are at least once per year tested by a standardized test.
With regard to school autonomy, we report in the following section briefly the separate effects of school autonomy on students' achievement, before we present in Section 5 a more detailed discussion of interactions between school autonomy indicators and external exit exams.
Responsibility in determining course content on school level has no statistically significant effect on students' achievements which is mainly caused by not disentangling the combined effect of determining course content as it is done in the next section. 18 Decentralized responsibilities on school level in choosing textbooks and deciding on the within school-budget allocation have statistically significantly positive effects on students' achievement ranging from summated 41.4 AP in reading to 45.2 AP in science. 19 This reflects the superior information basis on school level concerning the best use of resources in a beneficial way for the local student population.
School autonomy in formulating the school budget decreases contrarily students' achievement by 7.5 AP in mathematics, 6.3 AP in science and 3 AP in reading. 20 Rentseeking activities of schools and their personnel substituting activities with beneficial effects for students or a less efficient allocation of school funds between schools could be possible causes for the observed effects.
Responsibility in hiring teachers has statistically significantly positive effects on student achievement in mathematics (11.9 AP) and reading (5.3 AP) and a statistically insignificant one in science (2.7 AP), indicating that local responsibility is beneficial in hiring decisions (corroborating Wößmann 2003a). Responsibility in firing decisions has a negative effect on students' achievement which is statistically significant in reading. Collinearity problems of this variable which is highly correlated with responsibility for hiring of teachers can hereby potentially bias the results. 21 Complementary regressions neglecting the responsibility for hiring show a statistically significantly positive effect of school autonomy on firing which also occurs interacted with external exit exams in Section 5.
Responsibilities in related areas of personnel management on school level, such as determination of salary increases or the establishing of teachers' starting salaries have in this 18 The combined effect consists of one stand-alone effect which could be directly assigned to the institution and the interaction with the external exit exam indicator. 19 The result corroborates finding in Wößmann (2003a) . 20 The results replicate previous findings and thus corroborate argument presented in Wößmann (2003a). 21 Another issue which can potentially bias the results is the vaguely asked question for firing of teachers which could be misleading for principals. The question does not distinguish between responsibility of firing either poor performing teachers or e.g. teachers that strongly misbehave and heavily violate the rules. study a negative effect on students' achievement, admittedly mostly not statistically significant, which contradicts previous findings of Wößmann (2003a), stating positive effects of school autonomy in salary increases on students' achievement. This contradiction is in Section 5 partly weakened taking interaction terms additionally into account.
The public operation of schools has a statistically significantly negative effect on students achievement in all three subjects ranging from 15.3 AP to 19.5 AP. 22 These findings are robust to complementary estimations controlling for the composition of the student population body (in terms of median parental education per school or socio-economic status) and also to interactions with external exams which corroborates finding of Dronkers and Roberts (2003) who suggest that not the student-body composition but rather disciplinary and school-climate effects cause performance differentials between publicly and privately operated schools.
Considering the finding that a larger share of public funding of schools increases student performance (although it is only in mathematics a statistically significant effect), a combination of private operated schools which are public funded seems to be preferable compared to other possible combinations of school operation and funding models.
The general pattern of institutional effects shows that external exit exams are conducive to improving students' achievement, which is especially emphasized in Section 5. The sign of particular school autonomy effects depend on the specific decision-making area.
The relevance of the stated effects of different institutional settings is in this estimation considerably larger compared to previous studies, 23 accounting for 24.9% performance variation in science and 30.6% in reading (not counting variation accounted for by imputation dummies).
Interaction Effects between External Exit Exams and Other Institutions
In the next section, the results of a modified specification are reported (see also table 3). In this estimation, central exams are additionally interacted with institutional variables. 24 The basic idea underlying the specifications is that accountability, transparency and well-defined external standards, created and reinforced by external exit exams, constitute additional and differing incentives in terms of institutional effects/local opportunistic behavior compared to 22 Privately operated/managed schools are those schools which are managed directly or indirectly by a nongovernment organization, e.g. a church, trade union, businesses, other private institutions. 23 Cf. Wößmann (2002a) using TIMSS data, whereby 22% of performance variation in mathematics and 19% in science was explained by institutional differences. 24 The estimation equation is principally the same as the one specified in equation (1). systems without central examinations. 25 This section contributes to the literature on educational accountability by offering deeper insights into the complex within school dynamics of accountability systems and institutional effects. 26 Standardized testing has in school systems without external exit exams a statistically significantly negative effect in all three subjects which is probably related to vaguely defined goals and standards of the educational system. By introducing central external exit exams and hence defining clear and comprehensive educational standards, these negative effects are overcompensated and sum up to an overall effect for standardized testing ranging from 5.3 AP in mathematics to 7.4 AP in reading, corroborating hypotheses expressed in Wößmann (2003c).
A similar pattern can be observed for school autonomy in determining course content and in establishing teachers' starting salaries (for the latter the described pattern is only statistically significant in math) and to a less significant and clear degree in school autonomy for firing of teachers . The explanation for this pattern is the same as the one implied above.
In school systems which do not make schools accountable, or at least make information of their performance transparent, there is a negative effect on students achievement which reverses totally as soon as central exams are introduced since only then the school personnel takes advantage of the superior local knowledge on school level in a beneficial way for their students. 27 The need for central exams manifests especially in the results for school autonomy in choosing textbooks and the respective interaction terms. Responsibility on school level for textbook purchase in systems without central exams has no statistically significant effect, whereas the introduction of central exit exams, which limits local opportunistic behavior, leads to an statistically significant increase in student performance ranging from 48 AP in mathematics to 61 AP in reading, reflecting the beneficial effect of accountability and welldefined standards for a beneficial use of information advantages on school level.
The effect of school autonomy on deciding the allocation of the within school budget is positive with no clear tendency in favor of school systems with or without central exams. This 25 Cf. Bishop and Wößmann (2004) and Wößmann(2003c).
26 Hanushek and Raymond (2001) identify educational accountability as a potentially beneficial way to improve student performance, but admit that understanding the working mechanism is crucial for school reforms.
27 Cf. Wößmann (2002b). fact indicates that there is a significant knowledge lead on the local level with little evidence of systematic and huge opportunistic behavior on the school level. 28 School autonomy in determining teachers' salary increases and in hiring teachers (the latter at least in science and reading) has no statistically significant effects on student performance. The effect of hiring of teachers in mathematics is quite strange and in line with findings of previous studies showing overall some weak evidence for information advantages on school level. 29 School responsibility in formulating the school budget is in general detrimental, but admittedly only weakly statistically significant, for student performance with no advantage of school systems with external exit exams. This result confirms the above mentioned conjecture that decentralized responsibility in formulating the school budget increases either rent-seeking activities or decreases the overall efficiency of educational expenditure allocation according to disperse school needs and school tracks.
The effects of public funding and private management of schools are independent of external exit exams, generalizing the above suggested operational mix of privately run and publicly funded schools as suitable for school systems with or without central exams. 
Explanatory Power at the Country Level
In our regressions, the five categories of variables -student characteristics; family background; home incentives and inputs; resources and teachers; and institutions and their interactions -all add statistically significantly to an explanation of the variation in student performance. To assess how much each of these categories, as well as the whole model combined, adds to an explanation of the between-country variation in student performance, we do the following exercise. First, we perform the student-level regression reported in Table   3 , equivalent to equation (1) 
where the student-background vector B is subdivided into three parts as in Table 2 , namely student characteristics S, family background F and home inputs H:
The institutions category I includes the interaction terms between external exit exams and the other institutions as in Table 3 .
Next, we construct one index for each of the five categories of variables as the sum of the products between each variable in the category and its respective coefficient β. That is, the student-characteristics index S is given by
and equivalently for the other four categories of variables. Note that, as throughout the paper, this procedure keeps restricting all coefficients β to the ones received in the student-level international education production function, abstaining from any possible effect heterogeneity between countries or levels (e.g., within versus between countries).
Finally, we take the country means of each of these indices in each subject, as well as of student performance in each subject. This allows us to perform regressions at the country level, on the basis of the 31 country observations. These regressions allow us to derive measures of the contribution of each of the five categories of variables to the between-country variation in test scores.
As reported in Table 4 , models regressing the country means of student performance on the 5 indices yield an explanatory power of between 85.0% and 88.1% of the total crosscountry variation in test scores. This is reassuring with respect to our model specification, which is thus shown to be able to account for most of the cross-country variation in student performance, leaving little room for substantial unobserved country-specific heterogeneity.
Most of the unexplained variation in student-level test scores, which ranges from 68.8% to 74.6% in the regressions of Table 3 , thus seems to be due to unobserved within-country student-level ability differences and not to a country-level component.
To assess the contribution of the five indices individually, we perform two analyses. First, we enter each index individually and look at the R 2 of that regression, which would attribute any joint variation with the other indices to this index if they are positively correlated. institutions contribute considerably to the international variation in student performance.
Particularly in reading, the importance of institutions for the cross-country variation in test scores seem to be of greater than that of resources.
Conclusion
The international education production functions estimated in this paper can account for most of the between-country variation in student performance in math, science and reading.
Student characteristics, family background, home inputs, resources and teachers, and institutions all contribute significantly to differences in students' educational achievement.
The results based on the PISA study -with its focus on reading literacy, real-life rather than curriculum-based questions, age rather than grade as target population, and more detailed data on family background and institutions -corroborate and extent the findings derived from previous international student achievement studies. In particular, the institutional structure of the education system is again found to exert important effects on how much students learn, consistently across the three subjects. The importance of central exams as currency of the educational system and for limiting local opportunistic behavior is corroborated in the analysis, suggesting to link institutional reforms directly with the introduction of central exit exams or other effective accountability system. This study identifies also primary areas for increased school-level autonomy in systems with central exit exams and names also school-30 Note that part of the variation attributed to resources comes from the counterintuitive positive coefficient on class size. specific decision-making areas which exert detrimental effects on students' achievement in interaction with central exit exams. Wößmann, Ludger (2003a 
Appendix: Data Imputation Method
To obtain a complete dataset for all students for whom we have performance data, we imputed missing values of explanatory variables using a set of "fundamental" explanatory variables F that were available for all students. These fundamental variables F include gender, age, six grade dummies, three family-status dummies (reporting which parent(s) the students live with), six dummies for the number of books at home, GDP per capita as a measure of the country's level of economic development, and the country's average educational expenditure per student in secondary education. 31 Missing values for student i of the variable M were imputed by first regressing F on available values (s) of M:
Then, the imputed value of M for i was predicted using student i's values of the F variables and the coefficient vector θ obtained in regression (A1):
The imputation method for implied variables was a WLS estimation for discrete variables, an ordered probit model for ordinal variables, and a probit model for dichotomous variables.
Predicted values for discrete variables were then filled in for missing data, while for ordinal and dichotomous variables, the category with the highest probability was filled in for missing data.
31
The small amount of missing data on the variables in F was imputed by the use of median imputation on the lowest available level (school or country). Table 2 , with one regression in each subject, only with the addition of interaction terms between external exit exams and other institutions. -Coef.: Coefficient estimate on the dummy (representing the effect in school systems without external exit exams). -Inter.: Coefficient estimate on the Interaction term between the dummy and external exit exams (representing the difference in the effect between school systems without and with external exit exams). -Std. Err.: Clustering-robust standard error (taking account of correlated error terms within schools).
Significance level (based on clustering-robust standard errors): *** 1 percent. -** 5 percent. -* 10 percent. 
